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CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT*
This symposium marks the coming-of-age of the subject of damages
for personal injuries. In the decade since the end of World War II,
techniques of personal injury litigation have been revolutionized, with
the revolution centering in large part on methods of proof and argument
as to damages. The present symposium is the first systematic examina-
tion in legal literature of personal injury damages in the light of these
new techniques.
McCormick's classic hornbook on damages, published in 1935, de-
voted only 36 of its 713 pages to damages for personal injuries, and an
additional 40 pages to damages in death actions. The 84 page survey of
Developments in the Law--Damages by which the Harvard Law Re-
view, in 1947, brought the McCormick book up to date spent only six
pages on death and personal injury actions. Patently these page allot-
ments do not purport to correspond to the practical importance of injury
and death actions. The answer must be that they represent the authors'
judgment as to the intellectual content of the subject of damages in
injury and death actions, as contrasted with damages in actions involving
property or contracts.
The sad fact is that this evaluation, 'by Dean McCormick and by
the editors of the Harvard Law Review, was strikingly sound. As re-
cently as a decade ago, there was no well-developed law of damages for
personal injuries. The decisions set out a few precepts, usually platitudi-
nous, and occasionally ventured into such peripheral areas as admissibility
of mortality tables, pleading rules about special damages, and recover-
ability of items for which the injured person had already been compen-
sated by an insurer, his employer, or some third person. Even to the
limited extent that doctrine had developed, it had done so in a manner
intensely depressing to the scholar. The offhand generalization and the
attenuated analogy to other areas of the law were almost always allowed
to suffice on issues where careful analysis would have been rewarding.
If the courts ever gave heed to the social purposes which an award of
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damages is intended to serve, they studiously avoided giving any hint of
this in their opinions.
There were, I think, three main reasons for this discouraging state
of affairs. First, and perhaps most important, was that it didn't make
much difference what the law of damages was in personal injury cases:
verdicts were generally small, while rigid concepts of "negligence" and
"proximate cause," teamed up with such old judicial favorites as
"assumption of risk" and the "fellow servant" doctrine, were a bar to
liability in many cases. Defendants could well afford to pay the few
verdicts which were entered against them, and did not need to be
overly-concerned with the theoretical basis for the verdicts.
Second, judicial review on issues of damages was extremely limited.
In federal court, as late as 1948, there was no review whatever of the
size of verdicts in an injury or death action. Review in state courts,
though more generally available, was typically inhibited by a rule, first
formulated by Chancellor Kent, that the appellate court could interfere
with the size of the verdict only where it was so large as to appear
induced by passion or'prejudice. It is true that both state and federal
courts discussed damage issues where they involved admission of evidence
or the correctness of instructions, but the type opinion so commonplace
today, in which the court sets out at length the evidence bearing on
damages and announces how much the jury could permissibly have
allowed for each item, was totally unknown.
Finally, there was a feeling that awards of damages for personal
injuries were essentially irrational. Who can say what the earnings of a
24 year old man, now permanently disabled, would have been at age 60?
Or the extent to which earning capacity is impaired by the loss of an
arm? Or the number of dollars which will compensate for a particular
experience of pain? Since there is no single "right answer" to such
questions as these, both courts and commentators usually were content
to accept whatever guess the jury had made.
There have been drastic changes with regard to all three of these
factors in the years since the war. The sums involved have become a
matter of great importance: liability has been tremendously expanded,
most notably in FELA cases, and the awards in particular cases are now
frequently very large. Not long ago a verdict for $100,000 would have
rated headlines around the country. Yet the latest issue of NACCA Law
Journal lists, for the six month period it covers, nineteen reported de-
cisions allowing verdicts of $100,000 or more, ranging all the way up
to a death award of $400,000, affirmed on appeal. The game is now
being played for big stakes, and it behooves both sides to press for a clear
definition of the rules.
Perhaps as a consequence of the larger sums involved, appellate
review is utterly transformed. In the last nine years 10 of the 11 Federal
Courts of Appeal have overruled their old decisions, and held that they
[Vol. 19
FOREWORD
can consider whether a personal injury verdict is too big. A similar trend
has been apparent in the state courts. The consequence is that reported
opinions discussing damage questions now appear in great volume, to
provide grist for the law review mills.
Finally, though the issues involved in computing damages are as
elusive as ever, modern techniques of proof of damage lend at least an
air-and in some respects, a real substance--of precision and mathemati-
cal exactness. We still do not know the extent to which the earning
capacity of a particular plaintiff is impaired by the loss of an arm; but
tables are available, and used, which show the average impairment ob-
served in a large group of persons so afflicted. There is still no price tag
for pain; but in an era when lawyers are asking, and juries awarding,
precisely $5 a day for life on this score, it becomes worthwhile to recon-
sider old cases which say that the award for pain and suffering need not
be reduced to present worth, and indeed even to ponder whether a
pecuniary award for a non-pecuniary loss is socially justifiable.
This symposium, then, stands as a symbol of the fact that for the
first time we have a law of personal injury damages worthy of extensive
discussion. This should not be an occasion of rejoicing, however, for
those with a vested interest in the status quo. The reader will notice
throughout the papers which follow an interest in, and criticism of, the
theoretical justification for particular segments of this new body of law.
The hard fact-inevitable in a subject which grew first carelessly and
then explosively-is that a number of the existing rules cannot be justified
in theory. For example, I think a good argument can be made for
ignoring income tax in computing damages in a suit for personal injuries,
but that it is completely unsound to use earnings before tax as a measure
in a death action. Authoritative doctrine, to date, has made no distinction
between the two kinds of suits. Problems such as this are brought into
sharp focus by the papers collected here, and similar writing in this area
which can be expected to follow. Those who are doing well with the
existing rules are not likely to be pleased as the law changes in the
direction of greater rationality-but perhaps this is the price they must
pay for having made personal injury damages a subject of such im-
portance that people are now writing about it.
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